In less than three weeks, millions will mobilize to vote for El
Salvador’s next president. It is widely believed that the results of
the March 15 election will open a new progressive chapter in the
country’s long, violent history of military and civil dictatorships. A
victory for the candidate of the leftist Farabundo Martí Front for
National Liberation (FMLN), Mauricio Funes, and his running mate
Salvador Sanchez Cerén seems imminent. Despite a dirty campaign against
the left, rampant fraud from the right, and heavy police presence at
the polls in legislative and municipal elections on January 18th,
voters catapulted the FMLN into position as the strongest political
force in the country, setting the stage for another win in March.
The FMLN’s path to national influence has been cleared with machetes
and defended with roadblocks, organized with political caravans and
public forums, door-to-door discussions, thousands of marches,
inspiring speeches, and political struggle within the government. Its
transition from peasant uprising to major political party has been made
possible by unions, students and campesinos, vendors and families,
teachers and nurses, mothers and migrants.
ARENA has tried to divide support for the FMLN by portraying a
criminal image of the party and attributing its rising popularity to
Funes, a journalist who critics call a “political moderate who only
serves for the photos.” But the FMLN’s current popularity is not an
isolated phenomenon and Mauricio Funes isn’t the anomaly the right
would like us to believe. It is true that Funes’ candidacy has
strengthened the FMLN’s chances of winning. His 20 years of
investigative journalism and his popular morning news show, "The
Interview," which provided a forum for the public to challenge the
government’s actions and official reporting, has given millions of
Salvadorans a long look at Funes and a wide-open view into his
politics. For this work he is widely respected. It is also true that
the FMLN’s current popularity is very much in line with increasing
electoral gains the party has made in past elections.
In 1994, the first year it competed in elections, the FMLN earned 12
mayoral seats and 22 legislative deputies; in the presidential
elections of 1994, 1999 and 2004, the FMLN earned 32%, 29% and 37% of
the vote, respectively. The 2006 mid-term elections marked a turning
point for the party as it closed an enormous gap in voter turnout and
won the election with 943,936 votes to ARENA’s 854,166. By that time,
the FMLN was governing over 40% of the total population of El Salvador
at the municipal level. Today, the party has 96 mayoral offices –
governing 60% of the population – and the most deputies of any single
party in the legislative National Assembly, holding 35 of 84 seats.
When asked in November 2008 by Nicaraguan newspaper The Monocle
why he was running for president, Funes replied, "There's an historical
opening for me to be president. The problems here are so powerful that
I can't continue working as a journalist. Journalism has allowed me to
know the realities of El Salvador – especially, the reality of poverty.
But journalism doesn't allow me to change that reality."
'The El Salvador We Want'
Financial exclusion and major news media blackouts have all but
dismissed the FMLN as a party, negating its popular support. Right-wing
ownership of mainstream media has made it practically impossible for
the left to fully participate in the established political structure.
Since the signing of the Peace Accords in 1992 and the recognition of
the FMLN as a political party, the party has consistently submitted
policy recommendations to the National Assembly to little avail. The
FMLN's long-standing political objectives can are reflected in its 2009
platform, which can be found in the 96-page of the Programa de Gobierno (Government Program).
The FMLN's political project is outlined by ten central principles
of action to be implemented at the highest levels of government:
1. Overcome unemployment, the high cost of living, poverty, exclusion
and inequality in the distribution of benefits and costs of
development.
2. Exceed the slow growth of the economy by accelerating and diversifying the country’s production of resources.
3. Overcome the insecurity of the population and state impunity.
Defeat delinquency and organized crime. Overcome violence and the
damage to norms of social coexistence.
4. Overcome exclusion and inequality in the access to knowledge and
reduce the gap of knowledge, science, technology, and information that
distances our country from highly developed countries.
5. Clean up public finances, ending incompetence and
irresponsibility in the handling of public money that precipitated the
financial crisis. Overcome the lack of political will and reach an
accord that opens a passage for the integral fiscal reform that El
Salvador needs.
6. Confront the effects provoked by the global economic crisis:
Agricultural insecurity, energy vulnerability, consequences of climate
change, and the local effects of the recession in the United States.
7. Unify the country: dismantle the foundations of intolerance, polarization and a fractured economy.
8. Remove the obstacles to democracy and to the implementation of the Peace Accords.
9. Overcome the fragility, deterioration, and degradation of state
institutions with legal security for people, families, and the life of
the country.
10. Overcome regional fragmentation and the lack of integration that
has impoverished and disadvantaged people in this region of the world.
Move forward toward integration that is justified by the interests of
the people.
Evidence of the FMLN’s popularity is not hard to find. It can be
glimpsed in massive attendance at rallies and in the results of the
first round of elections. Electoral opinion polls consistently show the
FMLN has the plan that voters want; and one that ARENA isn’t inclined
to follow: Putting the Salvadoran government to work for the Salvadoran
people.
According to the ARENA government, the FMLN is making promises it
cannot keep and its electoral campaign is only a smokescreen for its
true ambition: Creating "armed groups" of children in the Salvadoran
countryside for a fight alongside Hugo Chávez, Hezbollah, Colombian
guerrillas, and street gangs to overthrow the U.S Empire. This gem of
fiction makes one wonder what ideas must have been scrapped in ARENA’s
campaign strategy meetings.
A more revealing incident of ARENA’s militaristic preoccupations, if
less fantastic than the above-mentioned “Armed Groups” story, which has
received incessant and unsubstantiated coverage, was President Antonio
Saca’s address to the Salvadoran military on the “Day of the Soldier.”
On the military holiday in May 2007, Saca addressed a large group of
young soldiers and implored asked that they summon the spirit of the
soldiers who fought in the civil war to stop the “waves of dangerous
populism that threaten the region today.” Saca made similar statements
to war veterans in 2008.
Who’s Afraid of Populism? Who's Afraid of the Salvadoran People?
Reacting to its dire performance in the polls and the public's deep
opposition to some of its cornerstone policies, such as the repressive
“Mano Dura” (Iron Fist) policing program or the privatization of public
resources, ARENA would need a dramatic about-face to improve its
chances of turning the election in its favor. ARENA would have to start
by pulling back on its national water privatization plan, signing
public water provision agreements with the water workers' union. But
then the party would be going against its own commitments. ARENA could
gain voter confidence by canceling its mining contracts with Pacific
Rim Corporation and the scores of other exploitative projects it has
promoted in northern El Salvador. But that is not the ARENA party. It
will never choose such a path. For ARENA, predatory foreign investment
and diminished public ownership are signs of "efficiency" and
"progress."
ARENA has shown contempt for voters, while putting its friendly
foreign investors on notice of what looks to them as an impending
disaster: A functioning democracy. While asking for tougher electoral
intervention from the U.S. government, the party has spent nearly $10
million on a campaign of fear and distortion as well as requested over
$1.5 billion in international loans. ARENA party leaders who have been
selling El Salvador piecemeal to multinational corporations for years
are now working quickly to secure corporate-driven development
contracts before President Saca’s term expires in June. One such
project is the Port of La Unión, a multi-billion-dollar transnational
trade hub that ARENA believes should be 90% privately owned.
An FMLN victory would immediately open up the government’s
accounting books, exposing ARENA's systematic siphoning of national and
foreign aid budgets – this, among ARENA's myriad other abuses to the
people, land and resources of El Salvador. For example, the FMLN has
repeatedly cited the more than $600 million in still unaccounted for
“missing taxes” that corporations and individuals should be paying into
the national budget each year. In addition, the FMLN has repeatedly
denounced the fact that 85% of El Salvador’s land and commercial
sectors are owned by a five-family oligarchy.
Despite its worries and its reluctance to engage honestly with the
Salvadoran electorate, ARENA is not going down without a fight – even
if it means acting illegally. Indeed, it is pulling out all of the
stops in an attempt to buy the election. In perhaps its strangest act
of irony, the party is blasting email advertisements throughout U.S.
cities that offer discounted airfare to Salvadorans who are willing to
return home to vote for ARENA candidate Rodrigo Ávila. The $330 price
tag almost certainly guarantees a ride from and back to the airport and
a full-time escort, who will ensure that visitors find their way to the
voting box and then promptly return to work in the United States.
Interestingly, while mainstream media has helped the ARENA party to
stunt and vilify the FMLN's aspirations for government, Funes'
candidacy has been maintained as a positive and prolific campaign.
While the FMLN has had to pay exorbitant rates for costly and minimal
ad space in right-wing daily newspapers and primetime television slots,
the Internet contains dozens of interviews, monologues, campaign
speeches, and ads surrounding Funes and the FMLN campaign.
One of the most inventive media pieces of the campaign are the party's Microprogramas,
which are short, smart and stylish tutorial programs that explore
various aspects of El Salvador’s government and economy and outline the
FMLN’s platform on such issues. Each program lasts 5-10 minutes and the
FMLN has made 45 of them. The Microprogramas are windows into
how the FMLN has led public education campaigns in strengthening
people’s understanding and approach toward the government’s role in
Salvadoran society.
If the FMLN has its way, El Salvador will join the growing movement
for participatory democracy across Latin America in its own unique way,
as prescribed by the people who voted it into power. Funes has promised
a transparent budget prioritization process and a functional Attorney
General’s Office. He has also committed himself to strengthening
citizen's rights to basic necessities such as food, education, housing,
health care, and civil liberties, while enhancing El Salvador’s role in
the local and regional economy over the next five years. The FMLN’s
ability to make these goals a reality begins and ends with its base of
support and the poor majority.
“The people’s resistance in El Salvador walks on two feet; one foot
is the social movement and the other is the FMLN," says Estela Ramirez,
a factory worker turned union organizer. "The work of the government is
to create the legal and financial framework for all people and sectors
of society to be able to access the government. This way the majority
of Salvadorans can determine the course of our country’s future.”
Erica Thompson is a media correspondent for the Committee in
Solidarity of the People of El Salvador (CISPES). She can be reached by
email: erica.thompson76(AT)gmail (dot) com